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Corporations Accountable?
Achilles' Heels in Alien Tort
Claims Act Litigation
Douglas M. Branson*
I. Introduction
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) or Alien Tort Statute (ATS) permits federal courts to
take jurisdiction over claims arising out of certain torts no matter where in the world the
torts occurred. The Act permits non-citizens (aliens) to take advantage of this significant
grant of subject matter jurisdiction provided only that the alien, and thus the court, obtain
territorial (personal) jurisdiction over the defendant.
The territorial presence which will support jurisdiction may be minimal. One plaintiff
obtained jurisdiction over the Dutch-English Royal Dutch Shell because Royal Dutch main-
tained a small shareholder relations office in New York.' So-called transitory jurisdiction
will also do. A plaintiff obtained territorial jurisdiction over a Serbian-Bosnian war crimi-
nal by having the defendant served during a transfer at New York's Kennedy Airport. 2 The
first case of the modern era (not against a multinational) involved an unfortunate visit to
New York by a Paraguayan police official who had helped torture a youthful suspect to
death in Asunci6n. 3 The deceased's next-of-kin found and served the police official in New
York. The federal district court thereafter accepted subject matter jurisdiction, which the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld. Prior to that time, in 170 years, the report-
ers contained only a single ATS opinion.4
So far, then, Alien Tort Claims Act suits seem to be a perfect solution for those seeking to
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; Associate Professor of Law & Associate
Director, Center for International Law, New York Law School. Ingrid Wuerth provided comments,
which were gratefully received. Raymond Girnys provided research assistance.
1. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
2. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
3. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[W]henever an alleged torturer is found and
served with process within our borders, section 1350 [the Alien Tort Claims Act] provides federal
jurisdiction.").
4. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2009).
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hold large corporations accountable for environmental degradation, human rights viola-
tions, and other acts in distant foreign countries. That is especially true as to multinational
corporations, all or most all of which, like Royal Dutch, have a presence of some sort in the
United States.5 Of the 500 largest multinationals, a recent study characterizes 186 as hav-
ing a United States domicile, 126 with homes in the European Union, and 108 with head-
quarters in Japan.6 Of those 500, nearly all have a presence in the United States sufficient to
support territorial jurisdiction over them. So, to human rights lawyers and environmental
activists, the prospects of U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act cases against corporate behemoths
have seemed a bonanza.7
That is, until those activists file their complaints and first step through the courthouse
doors. There they are quickly brought to earth, back to law school fundamentals.8 Few mul-
tinationals are so ill advised that they do business directly in far-flung foreign places. In-
stead, most multinationals are great-great grandparent corporations, or great grandpa-
rents, of the entity (subsidiary) doing business and committing the acts of which the
plaintiffs complain. Interleaved between the great grandchild corporation and the house-
hold name multinational may be two or three layers of subsidiaries, corporations which we
might term a parent, a grandparent, and a great grandparent.9
The interposition of subsidiary corporations may be a problem for several reasons. The
front line subsidiary may be a no-assets corporation, or have only a few assets that could
5. judging by federal appellate opinions, since 1980 there have been forty-five cases, and approximately
seventy-five reported opinions, under the ATS which involved a multinational corporation as a
principal defendant Westlaw search, dated January 26, 2010 ("alien /s tort /s claim") (computation
by the author). Defendants have included Bank of America, Barclay's Bank, Boeing, Caterpillar,
Chevron, Coca-Cola, DaimlerChrysler, Del Monte, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Drummond Coal,
Freeport Moran, Exxon-Mobil, Pfizer, Raytheon, Rio Tinto, Royal Dutch, Texaco, and Union Carbide. Id.
6. MEDARD GABEL & HENRY BRUNER, GLOBAL, INC. 131 (2003).
7. Romero v. Drummond Coal, Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (turning back a defense
contention that the Alien Tort Claims Act did not apply to corporations. ("The Alien Tort Statute
provides no exceptions for corporations," although no other circuit has a holding squarely on point.)).
According to Marco Simons, Legal Director, Earthrights International, the issue of whether
corporations may be liable "under the law of nations" has recently again become a "live issue." Marco
Simons, Legal Dir., Remarks at the University of Washington Law School Symposium of Business and
Human Rights (Feb 12, 2010). One reflection of the potential bonanza effect is that since 1980, legal
scholars have published 188 articles dealing with the Alien Tort Claims Act, Legal Trac Search dated
January 25, 2010 (on file with the author), as opposed to only 176 published appellate court opinions
over the same time period, Westlaw Search dated January 26, 2010 ("alien /s torts /s claims") (on file
with the author).
8. Although humans can have only one Achilles heel, abstractions such as an ATS suit may have many.
According to veteran ATS litigators, recently it has come to pass that issues which plaintiffs' lawyers
thought settled have found receptive ears among defense attorneys and even some judges. Whether
corporations may be sued, whether ATS can provide a remedy for extraterritorial acts, heightened
standards for aiding and abetting, and a new-found inquiry into exhaustion of remedies where the
tort occurred are among the "live" questions with which ATS attorneys must now grapple. Judith
Chomsky, Remarks at University of Washington School of Law Workshops on Corporations and
Human Rights (Feb. 13, 2010). In the main, this article is an inquiry into one issue often forgotten,
piercing the corporate veil and related issues.
9. Another taxonomy involves naming layers of corporations in a group as first level subsidiaries,
second level subsidiaries, and so on. Another terminology sometimes used is to term first level
subsidiaries as direct subsidiaries and all other entities on lower levels as "indirect" subsidiaries. See,
e.g., ARTHUR PINTON & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAw 60-62 (3d ed. 2009).
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be attached to satisfy any judgment that the plaintiffs might obtain. The same may be true
of the parent and even grandparent corporations. Often most pressing of all, however, is
the agenda of the counsel and the human rights or environmental group or non-
governmental organization (NGO) that supports her. That agenda is to send a message as
well as to obtain damages. To send a message, the Alien Tort Claims Act lawsuit must name
and have a realistic prospect of obtaining a judgment against the household name (e.g.,
Royal Dutch Shell) multinational great or great-great grandparent company. The goal is to
reach the top.10 Often little thought has been given as to how to get there.
I acted as the expert witness-consultant on these issues in the first Alien Tort Claims Act
case against a multinational to play out, Doe I v. Unocal." Unocal involved the brutalization
of ethnic Karens by the Myanmar army. 12 Unocal, along with its joint venture partner, Total
S.A. of France, had retained the army to provide security for pipeline construction.' The
700 kilometer pipeline, 36 inches in diameter, and replete with compressor stations along
the way, was to go from offshore natural gas wells in the Andaman Sea to electricity gene-
rating plants on the outskirts of Bangkok, Thailand. In providing security, the Myanmar
soldiers impressed villagers into involuntary servitude, badly beat men, raped women,
abused children, and in one instance threw a baby boy into an open fire where he suffered
burns from which he later died.14
The attorneys who brought suit had no notion or idea that they would encounter any
obstacles that corporate law might impose. In fact, the initial complaint named neither the
subsidiary (Moattama Gas Transportation Company; hereinafter MGTC), nor the mezza-
nine level corporations (Unocal International Pipeline Corporation; Unocal International
Co.; Union Oil of California) as defendants. Likely, counsel for the plaintiffs thought that
they could file a complaint against the entity at the top of the chain, Unocal, a corporation
with shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and be done with it. Or equally likely is
that, focused on the merits as they were, the attorneys gave it no thought whatsoever.15
10. At the outset, the process may be inverted. That is, the question is whether the presence of the
multinational parent within the United States is sufficient to obtain jurisdiction of the out-of-state
(really out-of-the-country) subsidiaries. The question in turn depends upon whether the parent has
intermingled its affairs and those of the subsidiary. For analogous domestic cases, see, for example,
Empire Steel of Texas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 823 (1961); TACA Int'l Airlines v. Rolls Royce Ltd,
201 A.2d 97 (N.J. 1964). Or plaintiffs may contend that the parent corporation has acted as a principal
and the subsidiary as an agent. See infra Part Ill.C.ii. So the same sorts of issues from the top down,
which may arise at the commencement of a case, may also arise from the bottom up toward the end of
the case, involving the assessment of fault and damages. A caveat is that "[j]ust because a litigant has
been able to pierce the corporate veil for purposes of territorial jurisdiction ... does not mean that [a
later] attempt will succeed to pierce the corporate veil'on the merits.' " PINTO & BRANSON, supra note
9, at 54.
11. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd on reh'g (en banc), 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.
2005).
12. Id. at 939-43.
13. Id. at 952.
14. It was said that the first act of a Myanmar soldier was to impress at least two peasants into service to
carry his kit and otherwise act as (mostly unpaid) servants. See Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 942. Total
and Unocal utilized four battalions of infantry to provide security. ld. at 938.
15. The federal district court dismissed the ATS suit. Id. at 943. The Ninth Circuit reversed, id. at 932, but
granted a motion for rehearing en banc. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
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This article, then, is about the corporate law aspects of the litigation alternative to hold-
ing multinational corporations accountable. Scores of-indeed almost 200-articles de-
vote themselves to Alien Tort Claims Act issues.16 Those pieces, though, put the cart before
the horse. The first questions plaintiffs are likely to encounter involve piercing the corpo-
rate veil, enterprise liability, joint venture, agency, and choice of law. The next question is
whether corporations may be held liable under the ATS at all, criminally, civilly, as primary
violators or under secondary liability concepts such as aiding and abetting or participation.
According to a recent Court of Appeals decision in the Second Circuit, they cannot be.' 7
II. The Alien Tort Claims Act
First and second, Congress sought to give a forum in which aliens could seek judicial re-
dress for violation (dishonor) of safe conduct passes held by those who were to pass
though foreign lines or hostile territories, as well as to those who suffered at the hands of
pirates on the high seas.18 Third, Congress sought to create jurisdiction for ambassadors
against whom torts had been committed.
So, in the Judiciary Act of 1789 the drafters inserted a little noticed provision: "The dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of a civil action by an alien in tort only, commit-
ted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."19 As has been seen,
the provision, and the broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction it gave to U.S. courts, lay
dormant for 200 years.
Nonetheless, from the face of the statute, some points are clear. First, not every tort vi-
olates the law of nations. Whether a simple trespass or act of negligence violates domestic
law (municipal law in international law parlance) may not always be clear, let alone
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs filed an assault, battery, and negligence suit in the California Superior Court.
See Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 943. Over a number of months, the Superior Court held a series of mini-
trials. After an eight-year history, the cases settled in 2005, reputedly for $35 million. The
precipitating event was Chevron's pending acquisition of Unocal, during the pendency of which
Chevon allegedly had directed Unocal to clean up its litigation exposure. Id.
16. A Legal Trac search under "alien /s tort /s claims," January 25, 2010, produced citations to 188 law
review articles published since 1980 (search on file with the author). Since 1980 legal scholars have
published 188 articles; federal appellate courts have published only 176 opinions over that time.
Westlaw Search, supra note 7. Articles appearing in the last several years alone include John Cerone,
TheATCA at the Intersection of International and U.S. Law, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 743 (2008); Kelsy Deye,
Can Corporations Be Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 94 KY. L.J. 649 (2006); Hugh King,
Corporate Accountability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 MELB. U. L. REv. 472 (2008); Joel Slawotsky,
Doing Business Around the World: Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 1065 (2005); Comment, Civil Procedure-Pleading Requirements-Eleventh Circuit Dismisses
Alien Tort Statute Claims Against Coca-Cola Under Iqbal's Plausibility Pleading Standard, 123 HARV. L.
REv. 580 (2009). Then there are hosts of more delimited articles about ATS claims in specific areas of
law (e.g., products liability, labor, environmental) or in certain geographical areas (e.g., Papua New
Guinea; Iraq).
17. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010), petition for reh'g denied,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS2200 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-1491 (U.S. June 6,
2011).
18. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004) ("Blackstone ... mentioned three specific offenses
against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of England: violation of safe conducts,
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.").
19. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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whether it violates the law of nations (generally it does not). Second, in the main, the law of
nations applies to nations, but in cases of certain grave acts (involuntary servitude, geno-
cide) the law of nations applies to individuals (jus cogens offenses). 20 Third, though, if the
primary actor is a sovereign state, liability of those who assist the state or state actors, or
participate in their acts, may result in liability even if the primary violation is not a jus co-
gens offense. Although the standard (aiding and abetting? participation?) sometimes has
been unclear, the import is not. juridical persons who may not be liable may become liable
again because of the acts of others (i.e., sovereign nations) and the persons' involvement
with it, liability by the backdoor, so to speak.21
III. Recent Cases and Clarification of Issues
A. Pending Cases
Some cases have been quite celebrated. For example, in March 2007, the United States
sought and received payment of a $25 million fine from Chiquita Brands.22 The allegations
were that Chiquita had illicit ties with terrorist groups, namely, paramilitary forces in Co-
lumbia.23 The further allegations were that between 1997 and 2004 Chiquita had paid $1.7
million to the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC), whose members provided se-
curity to workers on Chiquita's banana plantations. 24 Allegedly Chiquita made further
payments for weapons and protection to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
(FARC) as well as to the National Liberation Army (ELN).
In 2007, International Rights Advocates brought suit on behalf of 173 members of fami-
lies who claim that they were objects of AUC repression. 25 They brought suit under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, seeking a judgment that could put Chiquita out of business: "Terry
Collingsworth, a lawyer . .. who is leading the multi-million dollar litigation, said: 'This is a
landmark case, maybe the biggest terrorism case in history. In terms of casualties, it's the
size of three World Trade Center attacks.' "26 The television program Sixty Minutes thought
the case weighty enough that the program featured a segment on the Alien Tort Claims Act
and the Chiquita litigation.2 7
20. Similarly, to violate a treaty sufficient for Alien Tort Claims Act purposes, the prohibition in the treaty
must be "specific, universal and obligatory." In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
21. See generally Andrei Takhteyev, Who Is to Blame? (and What Is to Be Done?): Liability of Secondary
Actors Under Federal Securities Laws and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1539 (2009).
22. Chiquita Faces Columbia Lawsuit, AL JAZEERA, Jun. 7, 2007,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2007/06/2008525121622267726.html [hereinafter
Chiquita]. See also Rhodri Davies, Columbia Trade Unions Fight On, AL JAZEERA, Sept 19, 2008,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2008/09/2008919201016521775.html.
23. See sources cited supra note 22.
24. See sources cited supra note 22.
25. See Chiquita, supra note 22.
26. See id
27. See 60 Minutes: The Price of Bananas (CBS television broadcast Aug. 9, 2009).
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B. Clarification of Legal Standards
In a few instances, through their personnel, multinational corporations commit offenses
which, even when committed by non-state actors, are against the law of nations. Usually,
however, plaintiffs claim that ATS liability exists because the multinational became some-
how involved in the acts of another (sometimes the State, sometimes in the act complained
of which is a jus cogens offense by a non-state actor, or, most frequently, the offending ac-
tivity was by a non-state actor but which involves state action). Recent decisions have
made clear that a multinational may become liable on the basis of having aided and abetted
the other actor's activity. 28
The acceptance of aiding and abetting as a basis for secondary liability is the good news.
The not-so-good news is that the legal construct (aiding and abetting) may not be your
mother or father's aiding and abetting anymore. Even worse is the news that a recent
Second Circuit opinion rejects liability for corporations generally under the ATS, in any
form, aiding and abetting or otherwise.29
In the heyday of securities litigation, plaintiffs sought to hold liable collateral partici-
pants (lawyers, bankers, accountants, celebrity spokespersons, and so on) for having aided
and abetted violations of the SEC general antifraud rule, Rule 10b-S. The secondary liability
construct generally was agreed to have three elements:
* That the primary defendant had violated the law;
* The collateral participant had rendered substantial assistance to the primary violator;
and
* That the collateral participant had been aware or, in the exercise of the slightest care
should have been aware, that the primary violator was violating the law.3 0
In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court eliminat-
ed once and for all the common law concept of aiding and abetting under the securities
laws, in the main because the Court found no basis for such liability in the securities sta-
tutes.31 In Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,32 the Court revi-
28. See, e.g., Sinatrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1258 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2009); Romero v.
Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he law of this Circuit permits a
plaintiff to plead a theory of aiding and abetting under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Act.");
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 287-88 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J. concurring) (per
curiam) (agreeing to adoption of the Restatement (Second) Torts' definition of aiding and abetting for
Alien Tort Claims Act).
29. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010), petition for reh'g denied,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS2200 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-1491 (U.S. June 6,
2011).
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974); 2 A.L.I. FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(b) (1980);
Landry v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b)
(1979).
31. Cent Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
32. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
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sited the issue, if only briefly, to reiterate its holding in Central Bank: Aiding and abetting,
including a particular version known as scheme liability, no longer exists under the federal
securities laws.
Common law aiding and abetting liability was not completely moribund, however. State
courts had been holding, and continued to hold, that collateral participants to corporate
transactions could become liable for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty by pri-
mary violators, with one difference: In addition to the existence of a primary violation, and
the rendition of substantial assistance to it, the collateral participant has to be proven to
have known that the primary violator was violating the law. 33 Mere conscious disregard of
the effects the primary violator's conduct would or might have on others would not do. So
aiding and abetting lived on, albeit in its strong form, or as aiding and abetting plus.
The level of aiding and abetting that federal courts have found sufficient to hold colla-
teral participants (multinationals here) liable in ATS may be termed not merely as aiding
and abetting, or aiding and abetting plus, but aiding and abetting plus plus or aiding and
abetting plus cubed (plus plus plus).
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that the
Sudanese military had engaged in genocide, torture, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity.34 The plaintiffs alleged that the multinational, a large Canadian energy company,
had improved two airstrips that it owned.35 The Sudanese military used those airstrips to
service bombers and helicopters used, inter alia, to clear all native population from buffer
zones surrounding the areas in which Talisman and its joint venture partners searched for
and produced oil. 36 Many of the alleged atrocities took place during that process. 37
The trial court, per Judge Denise Cote, found Talisman's activities to be "the activities
which . .. accompany any natural resource development business." 3s Companies improve
transportation facilities such as airstrips to fly workers in and out.39 They create, or have
created, buffer zones around compounds and production facilities for security reasons. 40
The activities alleged did not measure up as the type of substantial assistance that could
support an aiding and abetting claim. 41
Mindful of the Supreme Court's admonitions that any legal constructs used to fill in the
interstices of the ATS must come from an international law source and further one which
"would obtain universal acceptance,"42 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted
an aiding and abetting definition from an international source, namely, the Treaty of Rome:
33. See, e.g., Brasseur v. Speranza, 800 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Koken v. Steinberg, 825 A.2d
723, 725-26, 731 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL
STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLiCY 457-58 (2009).
34. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
35. Id. at 249.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 261.
39. See id. at 249.
40. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2009).
41. Id. at 261.
42. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004).
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[A] defendant may be held liable under international law for aiding and abetting a violation of that
law by another where the defendant
[1] provides practical assistance to the principal,
[2] which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and
[3] does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of the crime. 43
Thus the "mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions is purpose
rather than knowledge alone.... Only a purpose standard ... has the requisite acceptance
among civilized nations." 44
The ATS aiding and abetting standard requires not only a showing of intent but of mo-
tive as well. That defendant did what she is alleged to have done purposely demonstrates
intent, ordinarily sufficient under U.S. law.45 That defendant also intended the end or objec-
tive connected with performance of the act is motive, often the clincher for showing intent
but strictly speaking not usually required.46 To show that defendant knowingly traded the
securities proves intent (and is easy to do-persons don't usually trade by accident). To
show that defendant did so while in possession of inside information and in order to reap
large gains is icing on the cake-proof of motive (greed) is usually nice to have, with some
exceptions (for example, to pay medical bills for a sick child). Nonetheless, U.S. courts re-
quire that plaintiffs make such showings, of both motive and intent, in ATS cases.
Neither will just garden variety "substantial assistance," if there is such a thing, do. The
assistance plaintiff pinpoints must be "practical assistance" which the plaintiff shows had a
"substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime." Plaintiff must show something resem-
bling causation, that is, a causal link between the assistance and the crime alleged (geno-
cide, torture, involuntary servitude, and so on).
C. Closing Off Corporate Liability Alltogether
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. not only "deals a substantial blow to international
law and its undertaking to protect fundamental human rights[,]" 47 it strikes a death knell.
Formerly, there existed two paths toward narrowing the scope of ATS liability for multina-
43. Presbyterian Church ofSudan, 582 F.3d at 258 (quoting Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d
254, 332 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzman, J., concurring) ("[A] defendant may be held liable under
international law for aiding and abetting the violation of that law by another when the defendant (1)
provides practical assistance to the principal which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime, and (2) does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 259 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
45. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw § 5.3, at 272 (West 5th ed. 2010) ("A defendant's motive ... is not
relevant on the substantive side of criminal law."); see id. § 5.2, at 259 (explaining that it is intent to
do the act and to intend the natural and probable consequences that are most relevant).
46. Id. § 5.3(a), at 272 ("Motive has been variously defined as 'the desire coupled with the intention to
bring about a certain consequence[,]' as 'a desire viewed in its relation to a particular action[,]' and as
Ian ulterior intention-the intention with which an intentional act is done (or, more clearly, the
intention with which an intentional consequence is brought about.)' ") (citations omitted).
47. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2nd Cir. 2010) (Leval. J., concurring), petition
for reh'g denied, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS2200 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-1491
(U.S. June 6, 2011).
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tional corporations. First was the 'how' question: How may corporations be held liable un-
der the ATS? Under the how banner, defense lawyers and some courts gradually narrowed
the scope of secondary liability, culminating in Presbyterian Church's confinement of aiding
and abetting to internationally accepted norms of that concept.
Second, and more drastic, was the 'whether' question: Whether corporations may be
held liable at all under the ATS? Kiobel answers the whether question with a resounding
"no, never." Kiobel holds that all liability concepts, adjective as well as substantive, must
originate in international law norms. Further, applying Sosa, Kiobel limits those norms only
to those which are "specific, universal and obligatory." The court finds that no specific and
universal norms, including aiding and abetting norms where they do exist, provide that
corporations may ever be held liable, in any ATS context ("criminally, civilly or otherwise").
Finding only a few aiding and abetting outliers here and there,48 which fall far short of
"specific, universal and obligatory," effectively the court ends thirty years of ATS corporate
and multinational corporation liability. Henceforth, at least in the Second Circuit, interna-
tional law norms and ATS liability will apply only to flesh-and-blood individuals.
D. Pushing the Envelope in the Other Direction
In the multinational context, the basis for reaching beyond the actor (the subsidiary
which committed the crime or aided and abetted others who did) has traditionally been
ownership. The plaintiff drafts add-on counts for her complaint (veil piercing allegations,
enterprise liability theories) to reach the owner of all or a significant block of shares in the
subsidiary corporation, and then perhaps to reach the assets of a grandfather corporation
who owns all or most all the shares in the parent corporation. What about the case in
which the bonds between the actor and the add-on defendant or defendants are not own-
ership but contract?
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co. is such a case.49 Plaintiff labor leaders had allegedly been
held against their will, tortured, and some murdered in revenge for past (and to discourage
future) labor activism in Columbia.so The bottlers (one was Bebidas y Alimentos do Urab6)
collaborated with paramilitary groups.5 Since 1986, 4000 Columbian trade unionists had
been killed.5 2
The plaintiffs tried to reach the assets of Coca-Cola Columbia and its parent, Coca-Cola
Co., the U.S. multinational. Coca Cola Columbia had contracts (no owner relationship) with
the bottlers.53 The court found that the contracts gave the Coca-Colas only an ability to pro-
tect the trademark, not the day-to-day control which could cause ATS liability to reach up a
48. The Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions provide for corporate liability but only
in the contexts to which those multi-national treatise address themselves. See id. at 138-39.
49. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
50. Id. at 1258.
51. Id. at 1257.
52. Id. at 1265.
53. See id. at 1259.
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corporate chain.54 The court also held that plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of state
action.ss "There is no suggestion that the Columbian Government was involved in, much
less aware of, the murder and torture alleged in the complaint."5 6
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. is similar.5 The five plaintiffs had been suspected of
terrorism, thus subject to rendition to countries such as Egypt in which security personnel
subjected them to torture and long periods of confinement, bereft of judicial proceedings
or other intervention.5 8 Defendant Jeppesen had provided fueling and flight guidance to the
aircraft and crews that had transported the plaintiffs.59 In turn, jeppesen was a subsidiary
of a major multinational, Boeing Co. 60 The district court dismissed the case after the U.S.
Government intervened, raising the State Secret Doctrine.61 The Ninth Circuit found the
doctrine not to apply, thus remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Nonetheless, the case is interesting because the link alleged, at least in the first instance, to
the corporate actor is contract rather than ownership.
Although no case has decided the issue head on, the dictum of the Coca-Cola and the Jep-
pesen cases is that day-to-day control obtained through contract rather than through share
ownership is sufficient for ATS purposes. Such a theoretical outcome has implications for
the worldwide growth of franchising. The bond between the franchisor, usually a multina-
tional, and a franchisee is not ownership but contract, namely, the franchise agreement.
Courts have found overreaching by banks and other lenders (day-to-day control) some-
times sufficient to hold lenders liable for the acts of borrowers in the lender liability area.62
It is difficult to imagine a Burger King, A & W Root Beer, Subway, or McDonalds franchise
engaged in war crimes or genocide or aiding and abetting a state actor who has committed
those crimes. But the franchise world is almost a limitless one and the contract link may
lead to the specter of ATS liability for a franchisor in businesses such as aircraft, security,
air transport, and the like. The link sufficed to haul Boeing and Coca-Cola into court.6 3
54. See id. (citing to the opinion below).
55. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 578 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2009)
56. Id. at 1266.
57. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
58. See id at 1073-74.
59. See id. at 1075.
60. Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated by 614 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2010).
61. Mohammed, 614 F.3d at 1076.
62. See, e.g., A. Gay Jensen Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W. 2d 285 (Minn. 1981). See generally J. Dennis
Hynes, Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor, 58 TENN. L. REV. 635 (1991).
63. See generally Juli Schwartz, Note, The Alien Tort Claims Act: More Bark Than Bite? Procedural
Limitations and the Future of ATCA Litigation Against Corporate Contractors, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 867
(2006).
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IV. The Liability of Other Corporate Group Members
A. Relationships
The link which makes a corporation a member of a corporate group is ownership of
shares.64 A parent corporation owns the shares of subsidiary corporations, which may be
direct or indirect subsidiaries, according to one terminology sometimes used. Share own-
ership permits the parent to elect directors who in turn appoint the officers of the subsidi-
ary. There may be several tiers of subsidiaries, in which case the first tier corporations are
direct subsidiaries and the remainders are indirect. 6s The subsidiary may be wholly
owned, that is, by the parent, or partly owned, which means that the parent has control (or
a measure of control) over the subsidiary (power to elect directors and to influence the af-
fairs, policies, and direction of the subsidiary). 66 Subsidiaries which have a common owner
are brother or sister (sibling?) corporations. Transactions that flow from the parent to
subsidiaries are often called "downstream" transactions. Transactions that flow upward,
from subsidiary to parent, are "upstream" ones. Deals and transactions between or among
sibling corporations are known as "cross stream." The whole shebang, which might consist
of a parent, three or four tiers of subsidiaries, and countless brother-sister patterns, is re-
ferred to as a corporate "group."67
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil A/K/A Corporate Disregard
1. Choice of Law
The whole of the veil piercing doctrine, which by and large remains a subject for case-
by-case development, has been termed "mangled and muzzy." 68 Although the favorite cor-
porate law doctrine of courts, with at least 15,188 reported cases by one count, courts have
not even reached agreement on the proper law to apply, let alone parameters of the subs-
tantive doctrine.69 Defendant corporations may seek to have the court apply the internal
64. See generally PHILLIP BLUMBERG ET AL., 1 THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS 1-3 (1983) (explaining that
although the usual relationship is by virtue of ownership, it may be by contract, as in the cases of
franchises, dealerships, and other close contractual relationships: "Though the 'ownership' in the case
of subsidiaries is lacking in these other affiliates, it is not ownership but 'control' that enables the
parent to direct the management and operation of the various companies (subsidiaries and affiliates
alike) that constitute the group.").
65. See generally id at 1-6 (explaining that another terminology used is familial. From the bottom up, a
subsidiary may have a parent, a grandparent, and a great grandparent The average among the 100
largest multinational corporations is 187 corporations in the group. The leader was HCA with 1976
subsidiaries, followed by Viacom (879), Bank of America (712), Wachovia (663), Morgan Stanley
(629), and Pepsico (551)).
66. If a parent owns shares but has no ability to elect directors or direct policy, then the other
corporation is no longer a subsidiary and the parent's share block is nothing more than an
investment
67. BLUMBERG, supra note 64, at 1-3 ("[M]ultinational groups are typically complex, multilayered
corporate structures with first-tier, second-tier, third-tier and even more junior tier subsidiaries.").
68. Peter Oh, Veil Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81 (2010).
69. Id. at 7.
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affairs choice of law doctrine under which the law of the corporation's domicile (Delaware
or Nevada, for example) would govern. Defendants would urge such a choice of law when
the domicile state's laws are less conducive to veil piercing than are those of the forum
state or the place of the wrong, which may well be a foreign jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs would respond that a suit for tort or breach of contract involves an external ra-
ther than internal affair, so that the law of the place of the wrong, or the law of the place
designated the locus of contacts, should govern.70 Some commentators would split the ba-
by in half, applying the internal affairs choice of law rule for voluntary creditors but tradi-
tional conflicts rules for involuntary ones, presumably which would include tort clai-
mants.71 The better reasoned view seems to be that the court should apply the law of place
where the wrong occurred, at least in cases of tort, which is our subject here.72
In Unocal, the trial judge ruled that the law of the place of the alleged wrong, Myanmar
in this case, should govern the veil-piercing question.73 The defense law firms then, proving
foreign law as fact (as the Federal Rules used to require, and still permit) hired an expa-
triate Burmese who had been a law professor in Yangon. The professor submitted a report,
in the form of a lengthy affidavit, that Myanmar would not permit veil piercing in the case
at bar. Judge Chaney rejected the attempt, finding the entire report to be conclusory and
result oriented, in addition to being sloppy and otherwise ill-prepared. In the alternative,
the judge ruled that Myanmar had for some time had no functioning court system and
therefore no law she could apply, or that the professor really could opine on, for that mat-
ter.
The judge therefore decided she would look to the law of the parent corporation, in this
case Unocal International Pipeline Corp., which was a Bermuda corporation. The defense
firms, however, had made a tactical mistake. They had put all their eggs in the Myanmar
choice of law basket. They had no expert on Bermudian law and no ready prospect of lining
one up soon.
The trial judge made a finding that the applicable law, if unproven, could be taken to ap-
proximate the law of the forum state, in this case, California. This sequence of events was
fortuitous for plaintiffs, as California courts are among those most frequently to uphold
piercing the corporate veil (50.86% of the cases).74 Only a few states, such as North and
South Dakota, have higher rates, 85.71% and 83.33% respectively, but they may be termed
outliers, as the number of cases is small. 7s Professor Henry Winthrop Ballantine, who
taught corporate law at the University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law,
repeatedly opined that courts should pierce the corporate veil in any case in which the
court had found "the capital to be illusory or trifling, compared to the business to be done
70. Cf Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 94
n.311 (2006) ("Personal liability of... shareholders to the corporation and its creditors falls squarely
within the traditional understanding of internal affairs.").
71. Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder Liability, 106
HARV. L. REV. 446, 451 (1992).
72. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 3-2 (1991).
73. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd 24 F.3d 915 (2001).
74. Oh, supra note 68, at 34.
75. Id. at 33.
238
HeinOnline  -- 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 238 2011
Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable?
or the risks of loss."76 Although California courts do not pierce the veil on inadequacy of
capital alone, they come close.77 Ballantine's "optimistic reading of the prior [California]
cases" about the sufficiency of undercapitalization to pierce the corporate veil led to Cali-
fornia's "reputation as one of the states most likely to pierce the corporate veil."78
At the opposite end of the spectrum,
[t]he distinction of being the most difficult jurisdiction in which to pierce belongs to Maryland. Veil
piercing claims prevailed a paltry 25.81% and never against a corporate parent. This appears to be a
conscious product of Maryland's courts, which have described attempts to pierce the veil under their
state law as a "[H]erculean task."79
Although with a surprising paucity of law on the subject, possibly due to the expertise of
attorneys who incorporate clients in Delaware, Delaware is not far behind Maryland in the
rate at which its courts uphold corporate disregard claims. Delaware law "does not disap-
point, with a very low 32.29% veil-piercing rate, and litigants prevailing a mere 21.43% of
the time against corporate parents."8 o Delaware and Maryland have a "markedly restrictive
approach" that requires proof of actual fraud or use of a corporation pointedly to evade a
statute before courts will uphold a plaintiffs veil piercing claim.
This article cannot elucidate on all the finer, or even the basic, facets of the choice of law
question. Rather the salient fact that emerges from this discussion is that choice of law may
be very important, as courts may well end up applying the forum state's law, or a version of
it, and states vary widely in their treatment of veil piercing claims.8 '
2. The Doctrine As Applied to Unocal
Applying traditional veil piercing was difficult, even against the background of a pro-
plaintiff body of substantive law, as in California. The reason, likely to be similar in a great
many multinational corporation cases, was that plaintiffs would have to do it (pierce the
veil) three or four times to get where they wanted to go. They would first have to pierce
the veil between Moattama Gas Transportation Company (MGTC) and Unocal International
Pipeline Corp (UPIC) (Bermuda), then through another veil to Unocal International Corpo-
ration (UIC) (Nevada). Union Oil of California (California) owned 100% of the shares of
UIC. In turn, Unocal (Delaware), the "big tuna," if not to the plaintiffs then to the human
rights lawyers who represented them, owned 100% of Union Oil of California's shares.
A first obstacle was that UPIC owned only 28.25% of MGTC, neither complete (100%)
76. HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §130, at 303 (rev. ed. 1946).
77. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 81 n.10 (1986).
78. PRESSER, supra note 72, § 2:5, at 2-31.
79. Oh, supra note 68, at 32 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id.
81. A remedial implication of this is that plaintiffs' attorneys should be prepared to explore and prove up
foreign law. Two points may be made. Defense lawyers often believe that a resort to foreign law
favors them, as they almost always have superior resources. Resort to foreign law may backfire,
however, as, for example, many foreign jurisdictions have much longer statutes of limitation. Second,
proof of foreign law may not take as much in the way of resources as it used to. Although the
preferred method remains using a live witness to prove foreign law as fact, the Federal Rules of
Evidence now permits introduction of a learned treatise and its commentary as well as live testimony
by an expert witness, likely to be a much more expensive proposition. FED. R. EvID. 803(15).
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nor numerical (51%) control. Although most of the cases involve complete or, to a lesser
extent, numerical control, working control (less than numerical) will suffice. Two of the
MGTC shareholders were, if not free riders, just along for the ride. The Petroleum Authority
of Thailand Exploration and Production Co. (PTTEP) and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enter-
prise (MOGE) owned 25.5% and 15%, respectively. They in no way could be thought of as
players: They did not seek, let alone exert, control over the venture. Instead, Total S.A., the
French multinational, owned 31.25% and was, by contract, the manager of the joint ven-
ture. Total, however, consulted Unocal on every significant decision and would proceed no
further with an initiative if Unocal objected. Unocal had clear working, although not nu-
merical, control.
Total and Unocal formed MGTC in Bermuda in 1994. Despite the business objective,
construction of $1.2 billion pipeline, Unocal and Total contributed as equity a total of
$17000. MGTC had few, if any, employees. Unocal sent Unocal employees from Texas and
California to Myanmar who, while there, did the work of MGTC. The Unocal employees
functioned as would a borrowed servant under agency law, but the rub was not that this or
that employee was borrowed, but that every employee was borrowed. Beyond an organiza-
tional meeting, the Board of Directors never met. All agreements and other documents
provided notice be sent to Unocal headquarters in Los Angeles. 82
MGTC was not a "no asset" corporation. It held 28.25% of a $1.2 billion hard asset,
namely, a 700-kilometer pipeline. It may as well have been a no asset company, as no court
system existed in Myanmar with which a foreign judgment could be registered. Even if
Myanmar had a functioning court system, the ruling military junta would never permit an
attachment of the pipeline, especially by peasants who were, for the most part, not even
Burmese, but ethnic Karens.
A contention that defendants' lawyer made over and over was that if insurance existed,
adequate in amount to cover most claims, then no court would permit the veil to be
pierced. The whole doctrine was, according to the defense, about making plaintiffs whole,
or at least partly so.
Plaintiffs made two responses. First was that the doctrine was not about collectability of
judgments alone. The doctrine is also about setting up subsidiaries correctly in the first
place, with capital adequate for the business to be done and the risks of loss. The doctrine
is about giving subsidiaries functional independence (financial and governance indepen-
dence) so they can react to the environment in which they operate. Had UPIC had function-
al independence, complaints that were made would have been heeded and UPIC managers
would have directed the army to cease their harmful activities.
Second was that any insurance had was not really insurance. UPIC obtained a binder for
$20 million in liability from Myanmar Insurance, an agency in Yangon. Myanmar attempted
82. From El Segundo, near Los Angeles, Unocal made all payments directly to MGTC's Singapore bank
account, bypassing parent, grandparent and great grandparent corporations. Los Angeles staff set up
and kept the books. The managerial accounting function for MGTC resided with a Unocal manager
first in Trinidad and then in Sugarland, Texas. All pipeline cash flow was up streamed to Unocal, first
as payment of loans and then as dividends.
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to re-insure the risks in the London market. No London syndicate would assume the risk
unless London in turn could re-insure it, which they were able to do in the Bermuda mar-
ket. An insurance company named Pickwick Insurance picked up the risk. Who owned
Pickwick? Unocal did.
Insurance is the shifting and then spreading of a risk, or class of risks. The UPIC transac-
tion involved no shifting, let alone spreading. Unocal merely transferred the risk from the
left to the right pocket. Although liability insurance suffices as capital for purposes of the
doctrine, there was no real insurance here. Based upon its demonstrated refusal even to
talk settlement, let alone pay, either through itself or any of its subsidiaries, it was proba-
ble that Unocal would cause its Pickwick subsidiary to refuse as well. Plaintiffs had dug out
the facts from a three-foot stack of documents. Subsequent to being called on their insur-
ance charade, Unocal dropped the insurance argument.
Assuming that plaintiffs had been able to reach through the first veil, they would have
been confronted with another corporate veil, that between UIPC and UIC. In theory, plain-
tiffs might well have been able to pierce that veil. UIV had capitalized UIPC for $1000. The
UIPC Board of Directors never met. Instead, a sheath of unanimous written consents filled
the corporate minute book. Unocal had twenty-eight or twenty-nine corporate officials at
Unocal who were directors and assistant secretaries of various subsidiaries. This ensured
that someone was always available at Unocal headquarters to sign documents. UIPC was, in
the words of Professor Laty, "a subsidiary formed with nothing, having nothing, and in-
tended to end its existence with nothing." 3
Assuming success in hurdling over, or crawling under, that corporate veil, plaintiffs
would encounter yet a third corporate veil, that existing between UIPC and UIC. Here the
attempt to pierce came to a complete stop. UIC was a real corporation whose board of di-
rectors held meetings. UIC held the shares of all Unocal's foreign holdings. Those holdings
had a book value of $800 million and a probable market value much higher.
So after much heavy lifting, plaintiffs still would have been unable to reach the top, at
least under a veil piercing theory. After a two day hearing, the trial judge dismissed the veil
piercing claims against the parent corporation. Under no conceivable set of facts could
plaintiffs have reached Unocal, at least under the veil piercing, or as it is called in California,
the alter ego doctrine.
3. For the Plaintiffs
One of the best precedents in recent years, at least for plaintiffs in an ATS multinational
case, is United States v. Bestfoods, which is not a veil piercing case at all.84 Instead, the case
involves the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), which holds other persons and corporations responsible for Superfund cleanup
costs if they were either an "owner" of the site or an "operator" of the person who commit-
83. ELVIN LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS: A STUDY IN STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY 138
(1936).
84. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
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ted the offending acts.85 To determine who is an operator (a federal question) courts bor-
row veil piercing law from state law.
Corn Products International (CPI; Bestfood's predecessor name) owned Ott Chemical
Co., of Muskegon, Michigan, from 1965 to 1972.86 Ott's plant site was declared a Superfund
site.87 In 1989, the United States sued Bestfoods for tens of millions of dollars in cleanup
costs.88 Mr. justice Souter distilled the teachings of veil piercing law in order to flesh out
when a parent corporation may become an operator of a subsidiary.89
Mr. justice Souter states that "[t]he question is not whether the parent operates the sub-
sidiary, but rather whether it operates the facility [which the subsidiary owns]."90 The for-
mer is permissible and involves normal relationships between a parent and a subsidiary
growing out of the parent's status as a shareholder. Many of the parent's actions are merely
an exercise of its democracy rights. Those would involve electing directors, engaging in
long run strategic planning, appointing principal officers, and having joint directors and
officers ("directors and officers holding positions with a parent and its subsidiary can and
do 'change hats,' " notes justice Souter).9 1
Even some operation of the facility, rather than of the subsidiary, is permissible.
"[A]ctivities that involve the [subsidiary] facility but which are consistent with the parent's
investor status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary's performance, supervision of the
subsidiary's finance and capital budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and
procedures, should not give rise" to veil piercing.92
By contrast, when the parent sends its own employees to participate in the day-to-day
or week-to-week operating decisions, or otherwise attempts to dictate or influence those
decisions, the parent may lose its limited liability. CPI had sent its environmental and gov-
ernment affairs director, a Mr. G. D. Williams, on numerous trips to Muskegon.93 While
there, Mr. Williams had "played a conspicuous part in dealing with the toxic risks emanat-
ing from the operation of the plant."9 4 CPI, under its successor name, Bestproducts, lost its
limited liability.95
So parents may operate their subsidiaries but not the facilities of their subsidiaries. Such
a test comes close to establishing a bright line test for what parent corporations can do and
what they should avoid in corporate group contexts. By the same token, Bestfoods can give
ATS plaintiffs some inkling of when they may be able to pierce the corporate veil.
85. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1980).
86. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 56-57.
87. See id. at 57.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 67-70.
90. Id. at 68.
91. Id. at 69.
92. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 72 (1998) (citing Lynda Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and
Operator Analysis under CERCLA, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 223, 281-82 (1994)).
93. See id. at 71.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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4. For the Defense
On the other side of the ledger, corporations can and do segment their business precise-
ly to prevent the assets of the parent from being at risk for claims of the higher risk seg-
ment of the business. For example, an asset-rich natural resource corporation may put its
trucks and related assets into a separate transportation subsidiary. A petroleum explora-
tion and production company may form a separate subsidiary for its drilling operations.
Segmentation may also take place along geographical lines. The oil and gas company could
have separate drilling companies for Central American, Venezuela, and the remainder of
South America:
[S]ome corporations follow a segmentation strategy. They allocate their business to a number of
related corporations so that liability of one does not impact the assets of several others.... Pursued
in moderation, and when each subsidiary has a measure of functional independence and adequate
capital, a segmentation strategy may be legitimate.96
The magic words are "in moderation." At trial, the Unocal corporate treasurer testified
that at any given time Unocal had approximately 300 subsidiaries. The custom of the cor-
poration was to form a new corporation for each and every new venture, even if only at the
idea stage. Unocal seemed to have implemented a parody of the segmentation strategy.
One hallmark of function independence would be financial independence, including eq-
uity capital or insurance sufficient to stand for most, but not all, foreseeable risks. Unocal
had in place a cash management system geared to ensure that the opposite would be true.
At the end of each day, Unocal's treasury called on all subsidiaries to "zero out," or nearly
so. Unocal left each subsidiary only with funds sufficient to meet working capital needs in
the next few weeks. Every additional dollar was upstreamed to El Segundo in the form of
loan repayments or dividends.
At least in those jurisdictions in which inadequacy of capital is a sufficient, or nearly suf-
ficient, ground for piercing the corporate veil, such a cash management system would seem
anathema. Nonetheless, in Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., a Second Circuit panel turned back a veil
piercing claim grounded on Eastman Kodak's centralized cash management system.97 "All
funds transferred from the subsidiary accounts [to the parent] are recorded as credits to
the subsidiary, and when a subsidiary is in need of funds, a transfer is made."9 8 The court
indicated that "without 'considerably more,' " use of a centralized cash management sys-
tem is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil based upon thin or inadequate capitaliza-
tion.99
Fletcher seems to do great violence to the veil piercing doctrine, permitting a parent to
set up a subsidiary without any financial independence, in utter disregard of Ballantine's
maxim that capital, even of a subsidiary, must be adequate given "the business to be done
or the risks of loss."100 Such cash management systems also seem to be dishonest book-
96. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 60.
97. Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d Cir. 1995).
98. Id. at 1459.
99. Id.
100. BALLANTINE, supra note 76.
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keeping, allowing the excess cash flow and profits to be up streamed to the parent corpora-
tion while the liabilities remain bottled up in the subsidiary.101
C. The Uncertain Promise of Veil Piercing
From a doctrinal standpoint, at first blush, the objection seems to be that a plaintiff may
well have to attempt it (veil piercing) over and over again, and then over again once more,
as she attempts to reach up through the various layers of subsidiaries. Yet most corpora-
tions do not flaunt the rules as Unocal seems to have done. They do obtain real liability in-
surance. They capitalize subsidiaries adequately. They do not organize their front line op-
erating entities on a shoestring.
So, in a good many cases, under a veil piercing doctrine, the outcome may be counterin-
tuitive. The plaintiffs will encounter a subsidiary with insurance adequate for most risks.
The parent will be careful to limit its involvement to exercise of its democracy rights, per-
mitting the subsidiary, rather than the parent, to operate the facility of the subsidiary. The
plaintiff will not have sufficient grounds to pierce the first corporate veil, let alone three or
four. The ATS case begins and ends some distance away from the household name multina-
tional company. Under either outcome, therefore, traditional veil piercing doctrines are not
promising for plaintiffs in most ATS cases.
1. Enterprise Liability
Courts and commentators sometimes refer to cases of horizontal veil piercing (from one
sister subsidiary to its brothers and sisters), as in the taxi cab cases, as enterprise liabili-
ty.102 Over the last twenty-five years or so, this doctrinal offshoot of veil piercing has taken
on additional dimensions. 03 When entities of a corporate group (brother and sister corpo-
rations, parents, and grandparents) are under common control, and they contribute to a
collective endeavor, a court may hold them all to be one single enterprise. The court then
disregards multiple corporate veils. Such cases usually involve use of the same corporate
logo, interchange of corporate personnel, operation out of common offices, and similar fac-
tors.
An example of an enterprise liability holding is In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz.104 The
Court of Appeals held the ship's owner, Amoco Tankers, Inc., Amoco International Oil Co. (a
101. Of course, centralized cash management systems do not leave subsidiaries without assets (inventory,
plant, equipment, vehicles, and so on). Such systems merely deprive would-be judgment creditors of
liquid assets which could be attached.
102. For a leading taxi cab case, see Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414 (1966). In Walkovszky, Carlton,
the owner, divided his twenty cab taxi fleet among ten corporations. Id. at 416. Each corporation held
only two cabs and a liability insurance policy sufficient to meet the New York Financial Responsibility
law, then $10000. Id An issue in the case was whether all ten entities could be regarded as one
enterprise. Id
103. See, e.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations: the Barriers Presented by
Concepts of Corporate]udicial Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297 (2001); Phillip 1. Blumberg,
The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Liabilities, 28
CONN. L. REv. 295 (1996).
104. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
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sister), Amoco Transportation (parent), Amoco (grandparent), and Standard Oil of Indiana
(great grandparent) all to be one entity, responsible for cleanup costs occasioned by the
tanker's grounding and the ensuing oil spill.'o5 The court held the various corporations to
be elements of an integrated international enterprise. 106
In its defense in Unocal, Unocal produced an expert witness who testified that courts
had limited the enterprise liability doctrine to cases of horizontal veil piercing only, as in
the taxi cases. Even California had precedent contrary to what the law professor expert
witness stated. California courts had held a subsidiary real estate development corpora-
tion, its parent, and its grandparent to be one enterprise.107 Nonetheless, the applicable
precedent seems to have been lost in the shuffle. The trial judge specifically stated the she
understood the theory but that the question of adopting and applying the enterprise liabili-
ty doctrine to the case at bar was one for an appellate court.
So far, application of the enterprise liability doctrine is limited to what may be termed
outliers here and there. Given the realities of globalization, however, advocates of the
theory espouse as essential that courts move from an entity-by-entity approach (tradition-
al veil piercing) to an enterprise liability doctrine.10 8 That time seems not yet to have ar-
rived. By and large, multinational corporations may continue to bring home cash flow and
profits while keeping liabilities bottled up in a distant subsidiary somewhere in a foreign
land. 09
2. Agency Theories
That is, if they mind their businesses correctly, multinationals may continue to up-
stream profits while not becoming liable. Often multinationals do not. They become over-
involved in the businesses of the subsidiary and liability of the parent, or grandparent, may
result.
Many courts use principal-agent analogies to uphold veil piercing allegations. When a
court finds that a subsidiary corporation exists solely to carry out the owner's agenda, hav-
ing no independent reason for its own existence, then the corporation is found to have
been the mere agent or instrumentality of the owner. The corporation is disregarded and
the human owner or parent corporation is held liable.' 10 To invoke the theory, "[t]here
must be such domination of finances, policies, and practices that the controlled corporation
has, so to speak, no separate mind, will, or existence of its own and is but a business con-
105. See id. at 1304.
106. Cf Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the "single business
doctrine" but refusing to hold Hotel Westin Mexico and Westin to be so integrated as to support
application of that theory (plaintiffs decedent had been drowned by a rogue wave at Westin's Cancun
resort)). Id. at 591, 595.
107. Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1220 (1991) (applying the single
enterprise theory of liability).
108. Blumberg, supra note 103.
109. See Anita Bernstein, Conjoining International Human Rights Law with Enterprise Liability for Accidents,
40 WASHBURN L I. 382, 403-04 (2001).
110. See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 9, at 49-50.
245
HeinOnline  -- 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 245 2011
9 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 227(2011)
duit for its principal.""'
That is agency by analogy, used as an adjunct to or extension of veil piercing arguments.
There exists an entire separate field of play for agency law other than for use in making
analogies, what we might call agency in fact. According to veteran ATS litigators, actual
agency has become the legal construct they use most frequently to argue that the grandpa-
rent or great grandparent has become answerable, as principal, for the acts of the subsidi-
ary.
In Doe v. Unocal, the subsidiaries MGTC and UIPC had no employees of their own. Unocal
engineers, still paid by Unocal paychecks, physically participated in every phase of pipeline
construction: choosing a route, planning, safety, and operation. Unocal, not MGTC or UIPC,
had an office in Yangon which used Unocal stationery, invoices, and other paperwork,
staffed with Unocal managers. Unocal financial personnel in Sugarland, Texas did the ac-
counting for the venture. Along with Total employees, Unocal employees who frequently
flew to Yangon to do the subsidiaries' work had an expedited pathway through Myanmar
immigration, customs, and security marked "Total and Unocal Employees Only." There ex-
isted ample evidence to demonstrate that, on the ground, so to speak, the parent corpora-
tion had used and the subsidiaries actually had become agents in fact of the U.S.-based par-
ent.
Bauman v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., a recent ATS opinion by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, elucidated what kind of evidence may indicate an agent in fact.112 Plaintiffs, 23 Ar-
gentine citizens, sought to establish personal jurisdiction in a California federal court based
upon the presence in California of two Mercedes Benz marketing offices, offices of Mer-
cedes Benz USA (MB USA), a Delaware Limited Liability Company (LLC).11 They alleged
that they, or their next-of-kin, had been brutalized, tortured, or murdered by the Argentine
military, which had ruled the country from 1976-83. They further alleged that Mercedes
Benz Argentina had aided and abetted the military.1 14 These were the links to Daimler
Chrysler AG (DC AG), the German parent corporation: Argentina to California to Germany,
with the lawsuit to be filed and tried in California.
The court began with what parent corporations may do, noting "[alppropriate parental
involvement includes: monitoring the subsidiary's performance; supervision of the subsid-
iary's finances and capital budget decisions; and articulation of general policies and proce-
dures ... [I]t is entirely appropriate for directors of a parent corporation to serve as direc-
tors of a subsidiary."" 5
To determine whether a parent has strayed over the line, and the subsidiary becomes
the agent in fact of the parent, a two-step test is necessary." 6
111. WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONs 205 (perm. ed.,
rev. vol. 1963).
112. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated by 603 F.3d 1141 (9th
Cir. 2010).
113. Id. at 1091.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1095 (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001)).
116. Id.
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First, the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be
considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent, notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate
formalities. Control must be over and above that to be expected as an incident of ownership. Second,
the agent-subsidiary must also be sufficiently important to the parent corporation that if it did not
have a representative, the parent corporation would undertake to perform substantially similar
services.117
The court found control to be the sine qua non for a finding of agency.118 MB USA, LLC
had no power of control over Mercedes Benz Argentina.119 MB USA could neither be the
conduit back to DC AG in Germany nor the basis for establishing personal jurisdiction in
the U.S. over the Argentine company.120
A great advantage of the agent in fact theory is that it bypasses the layers of interme-
diate corporations. The theory may make the great grandparent household name corpora-
tion answer for acts done by the great grandchild subsidiary.
3. Joint Venture
This theory is similar. Along with agency, joint venture also adds to the mix issues of fact
which may enable plaintiffs to escape a motion for summary judgment. In the Unocal case,
while the trial judge dismissed claims alleging vertical entity-by-entity veil piercing and
enterprise liability, she kept agency and joint venture claims in the case. Further, because
those claims involved issues of fact, she held that a trial would be necessary to resolve
them. While her holding dismissing two of plaintiffs theories allowed defense counsel to
claim a significant victory, her retention of two other species of claims against the parent
corporation would lead to a trial and ultimately to a settlement.
"There are three basic elements of a joint venture: the members must have joint control
over the venture (even though they may delegate it), they must share the profits of the un-
dertaking, and the members must each have an ownership interest in the venture," accord-
ing to California courts. 121 Other jurisdictions' laws are the same,122 or quite similar.123
Joint venture is not a legal form of entity; it must take on a form of entity, such as a limited
117. Id. (citing Harris Rusky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1135 (2003)).
118. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated by 603 F.3d 1141 (9th
Cir. 2010) ("A relationship is not one of agency ... unless the principal has the right ... to control the
agent's acts." (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 101, cmt. c (2006))).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1098.
121. Orosco v. Sun-Diamond Corp., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1659, 1666 (1997) (explaining that owner
cooperatives of raisin packing cooperative are not engaged in joint venture). See also Unruh-Haxton v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 162 Cal. App. 4th 343, 370 (2008) (concluding that a complaint alleging a
joint venture of a university and a fertility clinic was adequately pleaded in cases involving theft of
genetic material).
122. See, e.g., Daniels v. Corrigan, 886 N.E.2d 1193, 1208 (111. App. 2008) (alleging that taxi companies were
joint venturers because they coordinated activities); Basel v. Westward Trawlers, Inc., 869 P.2d 1185,
1189 (Alaska 1994) (alleging that essential elements of a joint venture, sharing of profits or losses
and joint or shared control, were missing).
123. See, e.g., Jackson-Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Auth., 8 So. 3d 1076, 1089 (Fla. 2008) (quoting
Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So. 2d 510, 515 (Fla. 1957) ("A joint venture 'is created when two or more
persons combine their property or time or a combination thereof in conducting some particular line
of trade or some particular business deal.' ").
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liability company, or as in the Unocal case, a corporation (e.g., MGTC). If the parties do
nothing, a business joint venture is a partnership.124
When the evidence is in dispute, the existence or non existence of a joint venture is a
question for the jury.1 25 If the jury finds a joint venture, then the wrongful acts of one joint
venture if committed within the scope of the joint venture are imputed to the other joint
venturers, the same as the acts of one partner imputes to others in a general partner-
ship.126
MGTC, the operator of the pipeline, had four owners, or joint venturers: Total S.A. (a
French multinational), Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the Thai Electrical Au-
thority, and Unocal International Pipeline Corporation (UIPC). The allegation was that by
its actions on the ground in Myanmar, the great grandparent Unocal became a fifth mem-
ber of the joint venture. Unocal sent employees to Myanmar, it opened and staffed an office
there, Unocal employees made all the decisions, major and minor alike (UIPC had no em-
ployees), and represented Unocal in all joint venture dealings. Thus, prevailing legal con-
cepts would impute to Unocal the wrongful acts of its joint venturer, Total S.A., who acted
as general manager of the enterprise, who had hired the Myanmar army to provide securi-
ty, and who carried out no apparent supervision, let alone restrain, of the Myanmar troops.
V. Conclusion
The inevitable question asked by plaintiffs lawyers is "which theory is better?" Only par-
tial answers are possible. One seems to be that a traditional veil piercing attempt may be
arduous and bear little fruit, at least in the case in which multiple layers of subsidiaries ex-
ist, which is most of the time. An advantage of agency and joint venture allegations is that
the theories, along with some evidence to support them, help introduce additional issues of
fact into a case. Issues of fact enable plaintiffs possibly to avoid a summary judgment or
other pre trial dispositive resolution, enabling them to hold over, or hold on, for a full air-
ing of plaintiffs' claims.
For corporations, two words are key: Functional independence. Exercise democracy
rights in subsidiaries, to be sure, but capitalize them adequately. Obtain liability insurance
(real insurance) for risks that could eventuate. Operate the subsidiary and not the facility
of the subsidiary. The latter line drawing will permit corporations to avoid agency and
joint venture theories which will allow ATS plaintiffs to reach the top in one fell swoop.
Follow a segmentation strategy but not a parody of one as Unocal did.
Another teaching of this exposition is that knowledge of the ins and outs of ATS is only a
starter. These cases require a thorough grounding in the procedural, evidence and similar
issues that frequently arise. This article has touched on several of them: choice of law ques-
tions, secondary liability, and corporate law issues. The number of ancillary issues which
are likely to arise, and may be dispositive of a given case, has grown exponentially since
124. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997) (" 'Partnership' means an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit").
125. See, e.g., April Enters., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 820 (1983).
126. See, e.g., Unruh-Haxton, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 371.
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multinational corporations, and the large resourceful law firms likely to represent them,
have arrived on the scene.
Of course, all the putative law advice to corporate actors may be mere puffery if the re-
cent Second Circuit decision, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,12 7 achieves wide curren-
cy. If all ATS corporate liability ceases, as Kiobel holds it must, corporations have open to
them a much larger field of play in how they organize and structure their international
business affairs and in turning a blind eye toward human rights violations by their joint
venturers, partners and subcontractors. Rogue actors will note and utilize at least some of
the latitude so afforded them.
The last jeremiad is thus purely advisory but perhaps the most valuable one of all. Plain-
tiffs' attorneys should re-focus their sights. The ultimate value of ATS lawsuits, or some of
them, is not to hold the multinational parent liable, or to force the multinational to undergo
a long and complicated trial. The ultimate objective should be to send a message to corpo-
rate boardrooms and to obtain a recovery for persons who have suffered very real harms.
Unocal, Wiwa and Blackwater, among others, have done those things. With or without ATS
suits against them, many corporations have adopted codes of conduct, supplier codes of
conduct, and programs for auditing compliance with those codes. 128 ATS suits thus have
already served one of the highest and best purposes they could possibly have.
127. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010), petition for reh'g denied,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS2200 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011), petition for cert filed, No. 10-1491 (U.S. June 6,
2011).
128. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 62 U. Prrr. L. REv. 605, 639-46 (2001); Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social
Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1207, 1217-24 (2002).
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